The reduced form of a game. by Vermeulen, Dries & Jansen, Mathijs





Theory  and  Methodology 
The reduced form of a  game 
Dries Vermeulen *, Mathijs Jansen 
Universiteit Maastricht,  FdEWB, Kwantitatieve  Economie,  P.O.  Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht,  The Netherlands 
Received 18 December 1996; accepted 22 April 1997 
Abstract 
The goal of this paper is twofold. Firstly a short proof of the unicity of the reduced form of a normal form game is 
provided, using a technique to reduce a game originally introduced by Mertens. Secondly a direct combinatorial-geo- 
metric interpretation of the reduced form is described. This description is then used to derive an algorithm for the cal- 
culation of the reduced form of a game.  ©  1998 Elsevier Science B.V. 
1. Introduction 
Usually the strategy space of the normal form 
of an extensive form game contains  a  number of 
'duplicate'  pure  strategies.  Such  duplicate  pure 
strategies  arise  when  in  the  extensive  form game 
a  player  has  to  specify  his  choices  in  a  part  of 
the decision tree that is not reached in the eventual 
play of the game (due to his own choices earlier in 
the tree). In the normal form of the game these du- 
plicates lead to the same pay off for every player, 
no matter what the other players do. This specific 
property of duplicate strategies is usually referred 
to as payoff equivalence. 
Before solving a  game using the normal form, 
we are inclined  to delete all but one of such pay- 
off-equivalent  pure  strategies  from  the  normal 
form, since the resulting  game is easier to handle 
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while  the  strategic  possibilities  of the  players are 
not  changed.  Thus  also  the  eventual  solution  of 
the  game  should  not  be  altered  by  this  deletion 
process. The final result of such a deletion process 
is referred to as the semi-reduced normal form of 
the  (extensive  form)  game.  The  unicity  of  this 
semi-reduced  normal  form  up  to  changes  in  the 
names  of  the  pure  strategies  is  intuitively  clear 
since the elimination process only involves the pre- 
servation of exactly one element of each collection 
of payoff-equivalent pure strategies. 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) systematically in- 
vestigated as to what further extent payoff-equiva- 
lent strategies can be deleted from a  normal form 
game.  They  argued  that  the  process  of deletion 
should not only concern the removal of duplicate 
pure strategies, but also in their opinion pure stra- 
tegies that are payoff equivalent to other (possibly 
mixed) strategies can be deleted  from the normal 
form without harming the eventual solution. Thus 
they  introduced  the  reduced  normal  form as  the 
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game  'where  all  pure  strategies  that  are  (payoff 
equivalent  with)  convex  combinations  of  other 
pure strategies have been deleted'. 
Although  this description  of the  reduced nor- 
mal form appeals to the intuition it also has some 
drawbacks. Unlike with the earlier definition of the 
semi-reduced normal form, it is in this case not im- 
mediately clear that the process will lead to a  (in 
some  sense)  uniquely  defined game.  t  The  main 
problem  being  the  fact that  the  deletion process 
is  necessarily  performed  successively,  one  after 
the  other.  Thus,  the  resulting  game  depends  on 
the order in which pure strategies are deleted and 
a game may have different reduced normal forms. 
It is even not immediately clear that two exhaus- 
tive sequences of deletions require the same num- 
ber  of  deletions.  People  who  have  tried  to 
.construct a  direct proof of the existence of a  un- 
ique reduced normal form in some sense may have 
noticed  that  a  rigorous  proof can  get  quite  in- 
volved indeed. 
Nevertheless, it will be shown that  all reduced 
normal forms of a normal form game are identical 
up to what is called 'the relabeling of pure strate- 
gies'  in  Mertens  (1987).  The  proof is  based  on 
the  technique used  by Mertens  in  his  mimeo  for 
the  identification  of games.  This  technique  is  in 
fact an elegant way to capture the process of dele- 
tion in mathematical terms, as well as the 'relabel- 
ing'  of pure  strategies.  Given  this  technique  the 
proof  becomes  fairly  straightforward  and  quite 
short. 
The  second  problem  with  the  description  by 
Kohlberg and  Mertens  is that  it is  still not clear 
which game will eventually come out of the process 
of deletion of pure strategies, even if the existence 
of a unique reduced normal form of a normal form 
game is taken for granted. 
Concerning this problem, most people automa- 
tically  feel  that,  although  two  reduced  normal 
forms of a game may be different on a formal level 
as  discussed  above,  they  should  be  very  much 
alike, simply because it must be possible to predict 
beforehand which  pure strategies  are  going to be 
i This problem was pointed out to us by an anonymous 
referee and the editor in charge of a previous paper. 
deleted from the original game in the above pro- 
cess. We will show that this is indeed the case. Gi- 
ven an arbitrary (normal form) game, the results of 
the first part are used to derive a  direct combina- 
torial-geometric interpretation of the reduced nor- 
mal  form  of  that  game.  On  one  hand,  this 
interpretation may serve as  an  alternative defini- 
tion  of the  reduced  normal  form.  On  the  other 
hand it accurately describes which pure strategies 
are superfluous and which are not. More precisely, 
exactly one pure strategy payoff equivalent with a 
given pure strategy remains in the reduced form if 
and only if the collection of strategies that are pay- 
off equivalent with the given pure strategy is a face 
of the  strategy  space  of the  player involved.  All 
other  pure  strategies  vanish  completely.  Finally 
an  algorithm  based  on  this  combinatorial-geo- 
metric interpretation is given for the  actual com- 
putation of the reduced normal form. 
1.1.  Content of the paper 
Section 2  is,  save the preliminaries, concerned 
with  the  relation  between  the  deletion of a  pure 
strategy of a  given game  F  and the notion of re- 
ductions of F.  In  Section 3 the unicity of the re- 
duced  form  of  F  is  proved  using  the  language 
developed in Section 2,  At the end of Section 3 a 
criterion  is  provided  to  check  whether  a  given 
game actually is the reduced form of the game F. 
In  Section 4  this criterion is  used  to show that  a 
specific game  constructed  directly from  F  equals 
its reduced form. In Section 5 it is shown that this 
construction can be performed in finite time. 
Notation. For a finite set T, IT[ denotes the number 
of elements of T.  For a  convex set  C,  ext(C)  de- 
notes the set of extreme points of C  and for a  set 
D, ch(D) denotes the convex hull of D. 
2. Reduction and deletion of pure strategies 
In this section we will establish the relation be- 
tween the deletion of a  pure strategy and the no- 
tion of a  reduction of a  game.  (From now on we 
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work exclusively in the normal form context.) The 
latter notion of a reduction is based on a technique 
introduced by Mertens (1987) and this will, in Sec- 
tion 3, turn out to be the ideal tool for stating pre- 
cisely in what sense reduced forms are identical. In 
order to put our arguments for these assertions on 
a  sound basis we first need some notation. 
For a natural number n, N  := { 1,..., n}. An (n- 
person)  game  is  a  pair  F=  (A,u)  such  that 
A := Fig Ai is a product of n non-empty, finite sets 
and  u= (ui)icN  is  an  n-tuple  of  functions 
ui : A ---+ ~.  Here Ag is the set of pure strategies of 
player i and ui is his payoff  function. 
As  usual,  a  game  F  will  be identified with  its 
mixed extension. For this game, the mixed strate- 
gies of player i  are  the elements  of the  set  A(Ag) 
of probability distributions on Ag. By abuse of no- 
tation we will identify a  pure strategy a  E Ai with 
the  mixed  strategy in  A(Ai)  that  puts  all  weight 
on a.  So, Ag  will  simply be viewed as a  subset  of 
A(A/).  Also  the  pure strategy profiles will  be de- 
noted  by  a  E A.  In  case  confusion  might  occur 
we will write ag E Ag instead of simply a  E Ag. For 
a  (mixed)  strategy  profile  x =  (xi)icN E AA := 
Fij A(Aj), the (expected) payoff function of player 
i is defined by ui(x) := ~aEA I]jxjajui(a). Two stra- 
tegies yj and zj of player j  are called payoff equiva- 
lent if for all i and all x_j E 1-Ih#j A(Ah) 
ug(x jlyy) =  u,(x_ylzy). 
In  the  displayed  strategy  profile  (x_jlyj)E AA 
player j  uses the strategy yj E A(Aj) and his oppo- 
nents use the strategies in x_j E Fii#j A(A/). 
Now let F  =  (A, u)  be a  game.  In order to for- 
malize the process of (successive) deletions as de- 
scribed by Kohlberg and Mertens, let b E dj be a 
pure strategy that is payoff equivalent with some 
other (mixed) strategy zj E A(Aj).  Then the game 
F' =  (d', u'} induced by the deletion ofb can be de- 
fined as follows: first take 
AI :=  else 
and  then  define  u  I  as  the  restriction  of  ui  to 
A' := HeAl. 
Thus  we  can  give a  formal definition of a  re- 
duced form of F  as  follows.  First check whether 
there is a pure strategy of some player that is pay- 
off equivalent with some other strategy. If there is 
no such strategy, F  is called reduced.  If there are 
such strategies, pick one and delete it. This yields 
a game F' as previously described. Repeat the pro- 
cess using F' instead of F, etc., until finally (after a 
finite  number  of steps)  a  reduced  game  results. 
Such  a  game  is  called  a  reduced form  of F.  The 
question  now  is  in  what  sense  reduced forms of 
F are equal to each other. In order to give a precise 
meaning to this sense, and to get a short proof, we 
need  another way  to  represent  the  deletion  of a 
pure strategy, namely by means of so-called reduc- 
tion maps.  This representation was introduced by 
Mertens  (1987)  and  can  also  be  found  in  van 
Damme (1994). 
A  game F'=  (B, v)  is called a  reduction  of the 
game F  =  (A, u) if there is a map f  =  (fg)iEN from 
AA  to AB such that for every i E N: 
(1)  j~: A(Ai)  ~  A(Bi) is affine and onto, 
(2)  Ui =  Vio f  . 
The function vg o f  denotes the composition of vg 
and  f.  In  this  situation f  is  called  a  reduction 
map from F to F. Note that each fi preserves pay- 
off equivalence, i.e., for all xg and yi in A(Ag), xi is 
payoff equivalent with yg if and only iff.(xi) is pay- 
off equivalent with fdyg). 
Roughly  speaking,  reducing  a  game  captures 
both the  idea  of deletion of a  pure  strategy and 
the 'relabeling' of strategies. This specific combina- 
tion makes it an ideal tool to tackle the problem at 
hand.  However, first we need to establish the con- 
nection between deleting a single pure strategy and 
reducing a  game. 
Lemma 1. Let F I be the game induced by the dele- 
tion of a pure strategy b of  player j payoff equivalent 
with some other strategy zj E A(Aj). Then F ~  is a re- 
duction of F. 
ProoL  We have to show that there is a  reduction 
map f  =  (fii)iES from F  to F'. Obviously for i ~  j 
we  can  choose f.  to  be the  identity id/: A(Ai) --~ 
A(Ai).  For j,  we define ~:  A(Aj) --~ A(A~.) as  fol- 
!  lows. For xj E A(Aj) and a E A j, 
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Note that this definition makes sense, since the 
assumption that zj ¢  b implies that 1 -  Zjb is larger 
than  zero.  It  is  straightforward  to  check  that 
fi(xj) E A(A~) and that fj  is affine and  onto.  The 
fact that  ui =  u'  i o f  can  be seen  as  follows.  First 
note that both ui  and u'  i o f  are multi-affine maps 
on AA. So we only have to prove that they coincide 
on  the  set A  of pure  strategy profiles.  Now note 
that,  for  each  a  C A  with  a~ ¢  b,  we  have  that 
j0.(afl =  aj.  Furthermore,  u'  i is the restriction of ui 
to  the  set A'  of pure  strategy  profiles a  E A  with 
aj ~  b.  So  in  this  case  it  is  clear  that 
ui(a) =  (u I of)(a).  Now take a  pure strategy pro- 
file c C A with cj =  b. Then for each i E N, 
(ui ° f)(c)  =  Z  rI fh(ch).h u;(a) 
a6W  h 
=  ~  ,zj,,,(!  -  Zjb)-'ui(c_jlay ) 
a~EA'  I 
=  (1  -  -'ih)  '{ui(c  jlzj)  -  zjaui(c-jlb)} 
=  (1  -  zjb)  '{udc-jlb)  -  zjaui(c-jlb)} 
=  ui(c). 
The  penultimate  equality  follows  from  the  fact 
that b  and zj are payoff- equivalent.  [] 
Now we can also capture successive deletions of 
pure  strategies  in  terms  of reduction  maps.  Sup- 
pose that a map f  is a reduction map from a game 
F  to a game F' and that g  is a reduction map from 
F' to F". Then it is easy to check that the composi- 
tion g o f  off  and g is a reduction map from F  to 
F". Thus it follows from Lemma 1 that any game 
F ~ obtained from F  by the successive (not necessa- 
rily exhaustive) deletion  of pure strategies is a  re- 
duction  of  F.  So,  if we  have  a  way  to  identify 
two  reduced  games  that  are  both  reductions  of 
F,  we  also  have  a  way  to  identify  two  reduced 
forms of F. 
3. Uniqueness  of the reduced form 
After thus having translated the process of dele- 
tion  of strategies  in terms of reductions  of F,  we 
can again use reduction  maps to describe in what 
way  two  reduced  forms  of F  are  identical,  Two 
games F*  =  (B, v)  and F** =  (C, w)  are called iso- 
morphic  if there is a  reduction  map f  from F*  to 
F**  that  is also one-to-one.  It is equivalent  to re- 
quire  that  each .~  induces  a  one-to-one and  onto 
function  between  Bi  and  Ci.  The  well-known 
phrase 'the reduced form is determined up to the re- 
labeling of pure strategies' refers to the latter prop- 
erty  of  isomorphic  games.  In  the  proof  of  the 
isomorphy of two reduced forms of F we will need 
the following well-known lemma.  For a  proof we 
refer to Lemma 1 of Vermeulen and Jansen (1996). 
Lemma 2.  Let f  be an affine and onto map from  a 
polytope P  to a polytope Q.  Then ext(Q) is a subset 
oJ'f(ext(P)). 
Now suppose that f  is a reduction map from F 
to F* and that g is a reduction map from F  to F**. 
Theorem 1. If both F* and F** are reduced forms oj" 
F,  then  F*  and F** are &omorphic. 
Proof. (a) In this part we will only use the fact that 
F** is a reduced form of F. We will first construct a 
reduction map h from F* to F**. To this end, note 
that  for a  player i, f  is an affine onto map from 
A(Ai)  to A(Bi).  So Bi  C  J~(Ai) by the previous lem- 
ma. Then there must exist a  map si: Bi ~  Ai with 
(f~osi)(b)=b  for  all  bEBi.  Let  ti:  A(Bi) 
A(Ai) be the affine extension  of si,  Then  it is easy 
to  check  that  fi o ti  equals  the  identity  idi  on 
A(Bi). So, if we write t  := (ti)icN, then f  o t equals 
the identity on As. 
Now  define  h:  As---+ AA  as  h :=  (hi)ic N  with 
hi := gi o ti.  Clearly,  hi  is  an  affine map.  Further- 
more, for all i E N  and y  E AB, 
vi(y ) :  Vi((f 0  t)(y))  =  (vi of  o t)(v) 
=  (ui o t)(y) =  (wi og o t)(y) =  (wi o h)(y) 
because  for  is  the  identity  and  viof=ui= 
wi o g.  So  we  only need  to check  that  hi  is  onto. 
To  this  end,  take  a  pure  strategy  c E Ci.  Again 
by the previous lemma we know that  there exists 
a  pure  strategy  a  E  A i  with  gi(a)=c.  Write 
xi  :=  (ti o f.)(a)  E ti(A(Bi)).  Then 
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So, since the strategies fi(xi) and J~(a) are identical, 
they are certainly payoff equivalent. Then Xg and a 
must  also be payoff equivalent,  since J~  preserves 
payoff equivalence.  Thus,  since gi  also  preserves 
payoff equivalence, gi(xi)  and gi(a) = c  are payoff 
equivalent. Hence, c and 
(hi oj~)(a) =  (gi o  tio fi)(a) =  gi(xi) 
must also be payoff equivalent. However, since F** 
is  a  reduced  form of F,  it  is  certainly a  reduced 
game.  So,  since c  is  a  pure  strategy, we  get  that 
(hi o f.)(a) = c.  Hence, Ci c  hi(A(Ai))  and hi must 
be onto since it is affine. 
(b) Now since both F* and F** are reduced forms 
of F, part (a) yields a reduction map h from F* to 
F** and  a  reduction map h ~ from F** to F*.  It is 
sufficient  to  prove  that  the  onto  map  h  is  also 
one-to-one.  By  Lemma  2  we  know  that  both 
Ci c  hi(Bi)  and Bi C hi(Ci )  hold.  This however is 
only  possible  if  [Cil =  [Bi[.  Hence,  hi  must  be 
one-to-one.  [] 
Conclusion.  Thus  we  can  interpret the  reduced 
form of a  game F  as follows. First note that any 
two  reduced  games  obtained  from  F  by  the  ex- 
haustive successive deletion of pure strategies are 
isomorphic,  and  isomorphy  induces  an  equiva- 
lence  relation  on  the  class  of  all  normal  form 
games. So, all reduced games that can be obtained 
from F by successive deletions are contained in the 
same  equivalence class.  Hence,  the  reduced form 
of the game F  can formally be seen as the equiva- 
lence class  that  contains all  such  reduced games. 
Practically speaking, any game in this equivalence 
class can be called the reduced form of F  and then 
this game is said to be unique up to isomorphisms. 
Hence we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 2. A  game F*  is the reduced form of F  if 
and only if 
(1)  F* is a reduced game and 
(2)  F* is a reduction of F. 
4. Construction of the reduced form 
In this section we will show that for any game 
F  =  (A, u)  the  reduced form F*  of F  can  be  ob- 
tained directly from the game F  by the identifica- 
tion  of  the  strategies  within  certain  payoff- 
equivalence classes.  First  we  will  formally define 
this game F*. To that purpose consider the equiva- 
lence classes corresponding to the relation of pay- 
off  equivalency  in  the  strategy  space  A(Ai)  of 
player i. Let ¢i denote the finite collection of those 
equivalence classes,  say EI,...,Es,  in  A(Ai)  that 
contain  some  pure  strategy in Ai.  Let ~g  be  the 
collection  of those  sets  in  ~i  that  are  a  face  of 
A(Ai)  and  write  ~  := LiEN ~i.  Then,  since  for 
each player i and every E  =  (Eh)hEN E ~  the pay- 
off function ui is constant on the subset I-Ih Eh of A, 
we can define u~  :  ~  ~  ~  by 
So at least F*  :=/~-, u*)  is a  well-defined ob- 
ject. However, in order to show that  F* is indeed 
a  game,  we  need  to  know  that  ~,~, is  not  empty 
for each player i. In other words, we need to show 
that at least one of these equivalence classes is such 
a  face. In order to prove this, define 
Bi := {a E Aila E E, for some Es E ~i}. 
Furthermore,  let Es*  be  the  collection of pure 
strategies  contained  in  the  equivalence  class  Es 
and,  for  a  strategy  x~ E A(A~)  of  player  i,  let 
C(xi) := {a E Ailxio  >  0} be the carrier ofxi.  First 
we need to show the following lemma. 
Lemma 3. If E,. is not a face of A(Ai),  then there is a 
strategy z(s)i E Es with C(Z(S)i  ) C Bi. 
Proof.  Suppose  that  we  can  prove the  following 
proposition:  for  every  subset  •i  of  ~x'~  i  with 
ffi N ~i  =  0 we have: for every Es E aJi  there is a 
strategy z(s)i E Es whose carrier has an empty in- 
tersection with every E7 for which Et E aJi. 
Then  this  is  in  particular  true  for  (~ =  gg\~. 
Thus,  for  every  Esq~ ~  we  get  a  strategy 
z(s), E Es whose carrier has an empty intersection 
with every E 7 for which Et q~ ~z,  which means ex- 
actly that C(z(s)i ) is a  subset of B;. 
So, we have to show that the proposition P(k): 
for  every  subset  ~i  of  Ox~i with  [ffi[  =k  and 
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strategy Z(S)i E Es  whose carrier has an empty in- 
tersection  with  every E t  for  which  E1 E  c~i  holds 
for every natural number k. We will prove this by 
induction over k. To do this we need the following. 
(a) Assume that Es is not a  face of A(Ai). Then 
there  is  a  strategy y(s)~ E Es  whose  carrier is not 
contained  in E2.  Now let z(s)~  be the strategy ob- 
tained  by normalizing  the non-zero vector ~,aCE; 
y(S)~aa. Then it is straightforward to check that 
z(s)i=  [Zy(S)ia]-l{y(s)i--Zy(s)iaal 
L~E:  J  aEE:  ) 
is  an  affine combination  of the  payoff-equivalent 
strategies y(s)i  and  a  with  a  E E~.  Therefore z(s)i 
is also payoff equivalent with these strategies and 
hence z(s)i E Es.  Furthermore  it  is  clear  by con- 
struction  that  the  carrier  of z(s)~  is  a  subset  of 
the carrier of y(s)~ and that it has an empty inter- 
section with E~. 
(b) Now we can show P(1) as follows. Note that 
P(1) is equivalent with: for every Es f~ o~i there is a 
strategy z(s)i E E~ whose carrier has an empty in- 
tersection with E*. This however is a direct conse- 
quence of part (a).  So, we only need to prove the 
induction  step.  To  this  end,  assume  that  P(k)  is 
true.  We will show P(k +  1). 
Assume  that  there  is  a  subset  ~ff~ of ~i  with 
]~il  :  k+l  and  ~¢t°ino~i  is  empty.  Take  an 
EsEo~.  Since  k+l_>2,  we  can  also  take  an 
E~ E ~,  with  r Cs.  Then  both  ~i ::  ~i\{Er} 
and  ~i::o~ffi\{Es}  satisfy  the  conditions  of 
P(k).  So,  there  are  strategies,  let  us  call  them 
x(s)i E Es and x(r)g  E Er, with 
C(X(S)i ) n  U  Et =  O, 
EtEftfi 
n  lJ  E; =  O.  C(x(r)i) 
E~ENt~ 
If also C(x(s)i) n E~  is the empty set, then it is 
clear that the carrier ofx(s)i has an empty intersec- 
tion with every E t  for which E t E  ~i  and we have 
a proof of the statement for k -t- 1. So, assume that 
this  is  not  the  case,  which  implies  that 
~aEE; X(S)ia  >  O. Define the strategy y(s)i E Es by 
y(s), :=  +  Z  x(s),a[x(r),  -  a]. 
aCE; 
Now suppose that the carrier ofy(s), is a subset 
of E~.  Since  }--~aEE* X(S)ia >  0  by  assumption  and 
the carrier of x(r)i ~has an empty intersection with 
E~,  it follows  directly from the  definition  of y(s)i 
that  the  carrier  of x(r)i  is a  subset  of the  carrier 
ofy(s)r  So, the carrier ofx(r)i  must also be a sub- 
set of E~. This would imply that x(r)i is an element 
of Es, which is impossible since x(r)~  is an element 
of Er and Er¢  E,. 
Thus  we know that  the  carrier of y(s)~ E E,  is 
not contained in E~.. So, we can apply the construc- 
tion described in part (a) to y(s)~ to obtain a strat- 
egy  z(s)i E Es  whose  carrier  is  contained  in  the 
carrier of y(s)~  and has an empty intersection with 
E;. Now note that the carrier ofy(s)i  has an empty 
intersection  with  E~  and  every  E t  with 
Et E ~i n ~'i = ~i\  {E~,Er}.  Hence,  the  carrier of 
z(s)~ E Es has an empty intersection with every E~ 
for  which  Et E .¢gi. This  concludes  the  proof of 
the induction  step.  [] 
Now  it  is easy to  show  that  ~g  is  not  empty. 
Suppose  that  it  is  empty.  Then  none  of the  ele- 
ments  of the non-empty set gi  is a  face of A(Ag). 
So,  we  can  take  an E~ Egg  that  is  not  a  face  of 
A(Ai)  and  by  Lemma  3  there  is  a  strategy 
z(s)i c  E~ such that 
C(z(s)i ) n Ai = C(z(s)i ) n UE;  = O. 
tES 
Since this is impossible, we know that ~i  is not 
empty. Hence, F*  :=  (o~, u*)  is indeed a game. Fi- 
nally we will  show  that  F*  is indeed  the  reduced 
form of F.  So,  by Theorem 2,  we  need  to  prove 
that F* is a reduction of F  and that F* is a reduced 
game. First we will prove that F*  is a reduction of 
F.  It  is  convenient  to  split  this  proof  into  two 
parts.  Consider  the  game  F'=  (B,d)  wherein 
u'j:  ~  IR  is  the  restriction  of  ui  to  the  subset 
B := 1--bEN Bi of A. 
Lemma 4.  The game  F' is a reduction  of F. 
Proof. We will  show  that there exists a  reduction 
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To this end, take a player i and a pure strategy 
a ~ Bi.  Then the equivalence class in  ox'~i that con- 
tains  a  is  not  an  element  of ~-~. So  we  can  use 
Lemma 3 and choose a strategy z(a)i that is payoff 
equivalent with a  while C(z(a)i ) c  Bi.  (Obviously 
we can coordinate these choices in such a way that 
z(a)i = z(b)i  whenever a  is payoff equivalent with 
b,  but  this  is  not  necessary  for  our  argument.) 
We introduce the map f  : A(Ai)  --* A(Bi) with, for 
every xi E A(Ai)  and every b E Bi, 
:=  + 
aq~Bi 
Note that fi(xi)  is an element of A(Bi) because of 
the fact that C(z(a)i ) C Bi for every z(a)r  Further- 
more, it is easily verified that J~ is affine and onto. 
So, we only have to show that ui =  u'  i o f. The 
exact proof of this,  although not difficult, is a  bit 
messy. Therefore we will only present one step of 
the  proof.  Take  i,jEN  and  xEAA.  For 
b =  (bi)i~N E B,  write  b-i =  (bj)j# i  and  I-[b_, = 
Hh#ifh(Xh)bh"  Then 
(UJ Os)(x)  :  Z  fi(Xi)b, H  u;.(b) 
bEB  b 
=  Uj(b-dbD  • 
b tEB-i b-i biEBi 




=  Z  [  xibi At- ZXiaZ(a)ib,] uj(b-i[bi) 
bicBi  a([Bi 
=  Z  Xib,  uj(b-ilbi)+  ZXia  Z  z(a)ib, uj(b-ilbi) 
biEBi  a~Bi  bicBi 
=  ~-~x~au/(b_~la)  + ~-~x~uj(b_,[ z(a)~) 
aEBi  aliBi 
-~- Z  XiaUj(b-ila) -[- ZXiaUj(b-ila)  =  uj(b-,lxD. 
aEBs  aliBi 
(u;.o s)(x)  =  27 II  u (b_,i x,/. 
bEB b i 
Thus,  repetition  of this  computation  eventually 
yields the equality (u~. o f)(x) =  uj(x).  Hence, f  is 
a  reduction map from F  to F'.  [] 
Secondly, we have the following lemma. 
Lemma 5.  The game  F* is a reduction  of the game 
F t" 
Proof.  Define  for  player  i  the  map 
~i  "  A(Bi) --,  m(~i)  by, foryi E A(Bi) and E  E ~i, 
7~i(Yi)  E := Zyia 
aEE 
and it := (Zti)iEN. It is to be shown that n is a reduc- 
tion map from F t to F*.  Evidently rt~ is an  affine 
map onto A(~i)  for every player i. So it remains 
to be shown  that  rt preserves pay offs. However, 
there is a  simple argument why u~. =  u~ o n. Take 
a  pure strategy profile (b~)iES E B.  Let E(b,) E ~i 
denote the unique equivalence class that contains 
b,. Then 
,  ,  ,) 
=  Uj((bi)iEN) =  '  uj((bD, N). 
So, both u~ o zt and u) are multi-affine maps from 
As  to A~-  that agree on the set of extreme points 
of As.  Then they are necessarily identical,  which 
completes the proof.  [] 
The last two lemmas together show that zco f  is 
a  reduction map from F  to F*. So, F* is a  reduc- 
tion of F  and,  by Theorem 2,  the only thing  left 
to show is the following theorem. 
Theorem 3. F* & a reduced game. 
The third equality follows from the fact that the 
carrier of z(a)i  is contained in Bi  and  the  fourth 
one  from  the  payoff equivalence  of a  and  z(a)i. 
Now  the  substitution  of the result  of the  second 
displayed computation into the first one yields 
Proof. Suppose that it is not. Then for some player 
j  there must be a pure strategy E  E ~-j that is pay- 
off equivalent  with  a  strategy  zj E A(~j),  while 
zj #  E.  Furthermore,  since  7~ of  is  a  reduction 
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there is a strategy xj E A(Aj) with (ztj o J))(xj) =  zj. 
It is also easily checked that (ztj oJ))(b) =  E  given 
a  pure  strategy b E E.  Then  the  fact that  rcj o fj 
preserves payoff equivalence implies that xj is pay- 
off equivalent with b E E.  So, xj must also be an 
element of E.  However, E  itself is an element of 
.N  j, which means that E is a face of A(Aj). There- 
fore, xj must be a convex combination of the pure 
strategies b E E* in E. Since for all these strategies 
b E E*  it  can  easily  be  checked  that  (Ttjo~) 
(b)  =  E, it follows from the affinity of rcj o J) that 
also  (nj o fj)(xj) =  E.  This  however  contradicts 
the assumption that (rcj oJ))(xj) =  zj ¢  E.  Hence, 
F* must be a  reduced game.  [] 
5. Computational  aspects 
The  actual  computation  of  the  reduced  form 
F* =  (o  ~, u*)  of the game F =  {A, u)  can be done 
in finite time. To see this we will first argue that 
for each player i the set o~i can be computed in fi- 
nite time. To this end, take a  pure strategy b E A~ 
and let Es E gi be the unique equivalence class that 
contains  b.  Write A  g:= I-[h¢iAh .  Then E~  is  ex- 
actly the set of points x E N  A' that satisfy the finite 
system of linear (in)equalities 
for all j  E N  and for all  a-i E A_i: 
uj(a _ilx~) =  uj(a_i[b) 
for all a  E Ai : Xia >t O,  E  Xia =  1. 
aEAi 
Thus we have a polyhedral description of the poly- 
tope E, and the set ext(E,) of extreme points of E, 
can be calculated in finite time. Now note that 
E~E~  if and only if  ext(Es) CAi 
and that the second condition can also be checked 
in finite time. So, since there are only finitely many 
elements b E A~ and every element of Ni occurs at 
least once in the above procedure when b  ranges 
through A~, we have a  method to check within fi- 
nite time exactly which elements of gi are also ele- 
ments  of o~i.  Now  select exactly one  element in 
each set ext(E~)  for which E, E ~i. This selection 
yields a  subset Ci  of Ai.  Write C := I-L ci  and let 
vi be the restriction of ui to C. Since both the selec- 
tion process and the evaluation of ug on C can also 
be done in finite time, we can construct the game 
F' =  (C, v) from F in finite time. Finally note that 
F' and F* are isomorphic. Hence, F' is the reduced 
form of F  and can be derived from  F  in a  finite 
number of steps. 
Example. For the strategy space A4 of the second 
player of the 2 × 4-bimatrix game 
[0,1  0,2  0,-1  0,01 
F=  _0,-1  0,-2  0,1  0,0J' 
there  are  four  equivalence  classes  containing  a 
pure strategy: 
1  1  E, =  ch{el,2e2 +3e3,Te2 + ½e4}, 
E2 =  {e2},  E3 =  {e3}, 
2  1  E4 =  ch{e4, ~e2 + 5e3,ie, + ½e3}. 
Clearly ~2 =  {E2,E3}.  Hence,  the reduced  game 
of F  is the game 
[0,2  0,-,] 
0,-2  0, 1 
obtained by deleting the first and last column. 
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